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Abstract—This paper studies the problem of utility maxi-
mization for clients with delay based QoS requirements in
wireless networks. We adopt a model used in a previous
work that characterizes the QoS requirements of clients by
their delay constraints, channel reliabilities, and delivery
ratio requirements. In this work, we assume that the utility
of a client is a function of the delivery ratio it obtains. We
treat the delivery ratio for a client as a tunable parameter
by the access point (AP), instead of a given value as in the
previous work. We then study how the AP should assign
delivery ratios to clients so that the total utility of all clients
is maximized.
We apply the techniques introduced in two previous
papers to decompose the utility maximization problem
into two simpler problems, a CLIENT problem and an
ACCESS-POINT problem. We show that this decompo-
sition actually describes a bidding game, where clients bid
for the service time from the AP. We prove that although
all clients behave selfishly in this game, the resulting equi-
librium point of the game maximizes the total utility. In
addition, we also establish an efficient scheduling policy for
the AP to reach the optimal point of the ACCESS-POINT
problem. We prove that the policy not only approaches
the optimal point but also achieves some forms of fairness
among clients. Finally, simulation results show that our
proposed policy does achieve higher utility than all other
compared policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
We study how to provide QoS to maximize utility for
wireless clients. We jointly consider the delay constraint
and channel unreliability of each client. The access point
(AP) assigns delivery ratios to clients under the delay and
reliability constraints. This distinguishes our work from
most other work on providing QoS where the delivery
ratios to clients are taken as given inputs rather than
tunable parameters.
We consider the scenario where there is one AP that
serves a set of wireless clients. We extend the model
proposed in a previous work [8]. This model analytically
describes three important factors for QoS: delay, channel
unreliability, and delivery ratio. The previous work also
provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the
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demands of the set of clients to be feasible. In this work,
we treat the delivery ratios for clients as variables to
be determined by the AP. We assume that each client
receives a certain amount of utility when it is provided
a delivery ratio. The relation between utility and delivery
ratio is described by an utility function, which may differ
from client to client. Based on this model, we study the
problem of maximizing the total utility of all clients, under
feasibility constraints. We show that this problem can be
formulated as a convex optimization problem.
Instead of solving the problem directly, we apply the
techniques introduced by Kelly [10] and Kelly, Maulloo,
and Tan [11] to decompose the problem of system utility
maximization into two simpler subproblems that describe
the behaviors of the clients and the AP, respectively. We
prove that the utility maximization problem can be solved
by jointly solving the two simpler subproblems. Further,
we describe a bidding game for the reconciliation between
the two subproblems. In this game, clients bid for service
time from the AP, and the AP assigns delivery ratios
to clients according to their bids, to optimize its own
subproblem, under feasibility constraints. Based on the
AP’s behavior, each client aims to maximize its own net
utility, that is, the difference between the utility it obtains
and the bid it pays. We show that, while all clients behave
selfishly in the game, the equilibrium point of the game
solves the two subproblems jointly, and hence maximizes
the total utility of the system.
We then address how to design a scheduling policy for
the AP to solve its subproblem. We propose a very simple
priority based scheduling algorithm for the AP. This policy
requires no information of the underlying channel qual-
ities of the clients and thus needs no overhead to probe
or estimate the channels. We prove that the long-term
average performance of this policy converges to a single
point, which is in fact the solution to the subproblem for
the AP. Further, we also establish that the policy achieves
some forms of fairness.
Our contribution is therefore threefold. First, we for-
mulate the problem of system utility maximization as a
convex optimization problem. We then show that this
problem is amenable to solution by a bidding game.
Finally, we propose a very simple priority based AP
scheduling policy to solve the AP’s subproblem, that can
be used in the bidding iteration to reach the optimal point
2of the system’s utility maximization problem.
Finally, we conduct simulation studies to verify all
the theoretical results. Simulations show that the per-
formance of the proposed scheduling policy converges
quickly to the optimal value of the subproblem for AP.
Also, by jointly applying the scheduling policy and the
bidding game, we can achieve higher total utility than all
other compared policies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
reviews some existing related work. Section III introduces
the model for QoS proposed in [8] and also summarizes
some related results. In Section IV, we formulate the
problem of utility maximization as a convex program-
ming problem. We also show that this problem can be
decomposed into two subproblems. Section V describes
a bidding game that jointly solves the two subproblems.
One phase of the bidding game consists of each client
selfishly maximizing its own net profit, and the other
phase consists of the AP scheduling client transmissions
to optimize its subproblem. Section VI addresses the
scheduling policy to optimize this latter subproblem. Sec-
tion VII demonstrates some simulation studies. Finally,
Section VIII concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
There has been a lot of research on providing QoS over
wireless channels. Most of the research has focused on
admission control and scheduling policies. Hou, Borkar,
and Kumar [8] and Hou and Kumar [9] have proposed
analytical models to characterize QoS requirements, and
have also proposed both admission control and scheduling
policies. Ni, Romdhani, and Turletti [13] provides an
overview of the IEEE 802.11 mechanisms and discusses
the limitations and challenges in providing QoS in 802.11.
Gao, Cai, and Ngan [7], Niyato and Hossain [14], and
Ahmed [1] have surveyed existing admission control al-
gorithms in different types of wireless networks. On the
other hand, Fattah and Leung [6] and Cao and Li [5]
have provided extensive surveys on scheduling policies
for providing QoS.
There is also research on utility maximization for both
wireline and wireless networks. Kelly [10] and Kelly,
Maulloo, and Tan [11] have considered the rate control
algorithm to achieve maximum utility in a wireline net-
work. Lin and Shroff [12] has studied the same problem
with multi-path routing. As for wireless networks, Xiao,
Shroff, and Chong [15] has proposed a power-control
framework to maximize utility, which is defined as a
function of the signal-to-interference ratio and cannot
reflect channel unreliability. Cao and Li [4] has proposed
a bandwidth allocation policy that also considers channel
degradation. Bianchi, Campbell, and Liao [2] has studied
utility-fair services in wireless networks. However, all the
aforementioned works assume that the utility is only
determined by the allocated bandwidth. Thus, they do
not consider applications that require delay bounds.
III. SYSTEM MODEL AND FEASIBILITY CONDITION
We adopt the model proposed in a previous work [8] to
capture two key QoS requirements, delay constraints and
delivery ratio requirements, and incorporating channel
conditions for users. In this section, we describe the
proposed model and summarize relevant results of [8].
We consider a system with N clients, numbered as
{1, 2, . . . , N}, and one access point (AP). Packets for
clients arrive at the AP and the AP needs to dispatch
packets to clients to meet their respective requirements.
We assume that time is slotted, with slots numbered as
{0, 1, 2, . . .}. The AP can make exactly one transmission
in each time slot. Thus, the length of a time slot would
include the times needed for transmitting a DATA packet,
an ACK, and possibly other MAC headers. Assume there is
one packet arriving at the AP periodically for each client,
with a fixed period of τ time slots, at time slots 0, τ, 2τ, . . . .
Each packet that arrives at the beginning of a period
[kτ, (k+1)τ) must be delivered within the ensuing period,
or else it expires and is dropped from the system at the
end of this period. Thus, a delay constraint of τ time slots
is enforced on all successfully delivered packet. Further,
unreliable and heterogeneous wireless channels to these
clients are considered. When the AP makes a transmission
for client n, the transmission succeeds (by which is meant
the successful deliveries of both the DATA packet and the
ACK) with probability pn. Due to the unreliable channels
and delay constraint, it may not be possible to deliver the
arrived packets of all the clients. Therefore, each client
stipulates a certain delivery ratio qn that it has to receive,
which is defined as the average proportion of periods in
which its packet is successfully delivered. The previous
work also shows how this model can be used to capture
scenarios where both uplink traffic and downlink traffic
exist.
Below we describe the formal definitions of the con-
cepts of fulfilling a set of clients and the feasibility of a
set of client requirements.
Definition 1: A set of clients with the above QoS con-
straints is said to be fulfilled by a particular scheduling
policy η of the AP if the time averaged delivery ratio of
each client is at least qn with probability 1.
Definition 2: A set of clients is feasible if there exists
some scheduling policy of the AP that fulfills it.
Whether a certain client is fulfilled can be decided by
the average number of time slots that the AP spends on
working for the client per period:
Lemma 1: The delivery ratio of client n converges to
qn with probability one if and only if the work performed
on client n, defined as the long-term average number of
time slots that the AP spends on working for client n per
period, converges to wn(qn) =
qn
pn
with probability one.
We therefore call wn(qn) the workload of client n.
Since expired packets are dropped from the system at
the end of each period, there is exactly one packet for
each client at the beginning of each period. Therefore,
there may be occasions where the AP has delivered all
packets before the end of a period and is therefore forced
to stay idle for the remaining time slots in the period. Let
IS be the expected number of such forced idle time slots
in a period when the client set is just S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}
(i.e., all clients except those in S are removed from
consideration), and the AP only caters to the subset S
3of clients. Since each client n ∈ S requires wn time
slots per period on average, we can obtain a necessary
condition for feasibility:
∑
i∈S wi(qi) + IS ≤ τ , for all
S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}. It is shown in [8] that this necessary
condition is also sufficient:
Theorem 1: A set of clients, with delivery ratio require-
ments [qn], is feasible if and only if
∑
i∈S
qi
pi
≤ τ − IS , for
all S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}.
IV. UTILITY MAXIMIZATION AND DECOMPOSITION
In the previous section, it is assumed that the delivery
ratio requirements, [qn], are given and fixed. In this paper,
we address the problem of how to choose q := [qn] so
that the total utility of all the clients in the system can be
maximized.
We begin by supposing that each client has a certain
utility function, Un(qn), which is strictly increasing,
strictly concave, and continuously differentiable function
over the range 0 < qn ≤ 1, with the value at 0 defined
as the right limit, possibly −∞. The problem of choosing
qn to maximize the total utility, under the feasibility
constraint of Theorem 1, can be described by the
following convex optimization problem:
SYSTEM:
Max
∑N
i=1Ui(qi) (1)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
qi
pi
≤ τ − IS , ∀S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (2)
over qn ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N. (3)
It may be difficult to solve SY STEM directly. So,
we decompose it into two simpler problems, namely,
CLIENT and ACCESS-POINT , as described below.
This decomposition was first introduced by Kelly [10],
though in the context of dealing with rate control for non-
real time traffic.
Suppose client n is willing to pay an amount of ρn per
period, and receives a long-term average delivery ratio
qn proportional to ρn, with ρn = ψnqn. If ψn > 0, the
utility maximization problem for client n is:
CLIENTn:
Max Un(
ρn
ψn
)− ρn (4)
over 0 ≤ ρn ≤ ψn. (5)
On the other hand, given that client n is willing to
pay ρn per period, we suppose that the AP wishes to
find the vector q to maximize
∑N
i=1 ρi log qi, under the
feasibility constraints. In other words, the AP has to solve
the following optimization problem:
ACCESS-POINT:
Max
∑N
i=1ρi log qi (6)
s.t.
∑
i∈S
qi
pi
≤ τ − IS , ∀S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (7)
over qn ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N. (8)
We begin by showing that solving ACCESS-POINT
is equivalent to jointly solving CLIENTn and ACCESS-
POINT .
Theorem 2: There exist non-negative vectors q, ρ :=
[ρn], and ψ := [ψn], with ρn = ψnqn, such that:
(i) For n such that ψn > 0, ρn is a solution to
CLIENTn;
(ii) Given that each client n pays ρn per period, q is a
solution to ACCESS-POINT .
Further, if q, ρ, and ψ are all positive vectors, the vector
q is also a solution to SY STEM .
Proof: We will first show the existence of q, ρ, and
ψ that satisfy (i) and (ii). We will then show that the
resulting q is also the solution to SY STEM .
There exists some ǫ > 0 so that by letting qn ≡ ǫ,
the vector q is an interior point of the feasible region
for both SY STEM (2) (3), and ACCESS-POINT (7)
(8). Also, by setting ρn ≡ ǫ, ρn is also an interior
point of the feasible region for CLIENTn (5). Therefore,
by Slater’s condition, a feasible point for SY STEM ,
CLIENTn, or ACCESS-POINT , is the optimal solution
for the respective problem if and only if it satisfies the
corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) condition for
the problem. Further, since the feasible region for each of
the problems is compact, and the utilities are continuous
on it, or since the utility converges to −∞ at qn = 0, there
exists an optimal solution to each of them.
The Lagrangian of SY STEM is:
LSY S(q, λ, ν) := −
∑N
i=1 Ui(qi)
+
∑
S⊆{1,2,...,N} λS [
∑
i∈S
qi
pi
− (τ − IS)]−
∑N
i=1 νiqi,
where λ := [λS : S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}] and ν := [νn : 1 ≤ n ≤
N ] are the Lagrange multipliers. By the KKT condition,
a vector q∗ := [q∗1 , q
∗
2 , . . . , q
∗
N ] is the optimal solution to
SYSTEM if q∗ is feasible and there exists vectors λ∗ and
ν∗ such that:
∂LSY S
∂qn
∣∣∣∣
q∗,λ∗,ν∗
= −U ′n(q∗n) +
P
S∋n
λ∗S
pn
− ν∗n
= 0, ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N,
(9)
λ∗S [
∑
i∈S
q∗i
pi
− (τ − IS)] = 0, ∀S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (10)
ν∗nq
∗
n = 0, ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N, (11)
λ∗S ≥ 0, ∀S ⊆ {1, . . . , N}, and ν∗n ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N. (12)
The Lagrangian of CLIENTn is:
LCLI(ρn, ξn) := −Un( ρn
ψn
) + ρn − ξnρn,
where ξn is the Lagrange multiplier for CLIENTn. By the
KKT condition, ρ∗n is the optimal solution to CLIENTn if
ρ∗n ≥ 0 and there exists ξ∗n such that:
dLCLI
dρn
∣∣∣∣
ρ∗n,ξ
∗
n
= − 1
ψn
U ′n(
ρ∗n
ψn
) + 1− ξ∗n = 0, (13)
ξ∗nρ
∗
n = 0, (14)
ξ∗n ≥ 0. (15)
4Finally, the Lagrangian of ACCESS-POINT is:
LNET (q, ζ, µ) := −
∑N
i=1 ρi log qi
+
∑
S⊆{1,2,...,N} ζS [
∑
i∈S
qi
pi
− (τ − IS)]−
∑N
i=1 µiqi,
where ζ := [ζS : S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}] and µ := [µn :
1 ≤ n ≤ N ] are the Lagrange multipliers. Again, by the
KKT condition, a vector q∗ := [q∗n] is the optimal solution
to ACCESS-POINT if q∗ is feasible and there exists
vectors ζ∗ and µ∗ such that:
∂LNET
∂qn
∣∣∣∣
q∗,ζ∗,µ∗
= − ρnq∗n +
P
S∋n
ζ∗S
pn
− µ∗n
= 0, ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N,
(16)
ζ∗S [
∑
i∈S
q∗i
pi
− (τ − IS)] = 0, ∀S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , N}, (17)
µ∗nq
∗
n = 0, ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N, (18)
ζ∗S ≥ 0, ∀S ⊆ {1, . . . , N}, and µ∗n ≥ 0, ∀1 ≤ n ≤ N. (19)
Let q∗ be a solution to SY STEM , and let λ∗, ν∗
be the corresponding Lagrange multipliers that satisfy
conditions (9)–(12). Let qn = q
∗
n, ρn =
P
S∋n
λ∗S
pn
q∗n, and
ψn =
P
S∋n
λ∗S
pn
, for all n. Clearly, q, ρ, and ψ are all non-
negative vectors. We will show (q, ρ, ψ) satisfy (i) and (ii).
We first show (i) for all n such that ψn =
P
S∋n
λ∗S
pn
> 0.
It is obvious that ρn = ψnqn. Also, ρn ≥ 0, since λ∗S ≥ 0
(by (12)) and q∗n ≥ 0 (since q∗ is feasible). Further, let
the Lagrange multiplier of CLIENTn, ξn, be equal to
ν∗n/
P
S∋n
λ∗S
pn
= ν∗n/ψn. Then we have:
∂LCLI
∂ρn
∣∣∣∣
ρn,ξn
= − 1ψnU ′n(
ρn
ψn
) + 1− ξn
= 1ψn (−U ′n(
ρn
ψn
) + ψn − ψnξn)
= 1ψn (−U ′n(q∗n) +
P
S∋n λ
∗
S
pn
− ν∗n) = 0, by (9),
ξnρn =
ν∗n
ψn
ψnq
∗
n = ν
∗
nq
∗
n = 0, by (11)
ξn = ν
∗
n/
∑
S∋n λ
∗
S
pn
≥ 0, by (12).
In sum, (ρ, ψ, ξ) satisfies the KKT conditions for
CLIENTn, and therefore ρn is a solution to CLIENTn,
with ρn = ψnqn.
Next we establish (ii). Since q = q∗ is the solution
to SY STEM , it is feasible. Let the Lagrange multipliers
of ACCESS-POINT be ζS = λ
∗
S , ∀S, and µn = 0, ∀n,
respectively. Given that each client n pays ρn per period,
we have:
∂LNET
∂qn
∣∣∣∣
q,ζ,µ
= − ρnqn +
P
S∋n
ζS
pn
− µn
= −ψn + ψn − 0 = 0, ∀n,
ζS [
∑
i∈S
qi
pi
− (τ − IS)] = λ∗S [
∑
i∈S
q∗i
pi
− (τ − IS)]
= 0, ∀S, by (10),
µnqn = 0× qn = 0, ∀n,
ζS = λ
∗
S ≥ 0, ∀S (by (12)), and µn ≥ 0, ∀n.
Therefore, (q, ζ, µ) satisfies the KKT condition for
ACCESS-POINT and thus q is a solution to ACCESS-
POINT .
For the converse, suppose (q, ρ, ψ) are positive vectors
with ρn = ψnqn, for all n, that satisfy (i) and (ii). We
wish to show that q is a solution to SY STEM . Let ξn be
the Lagrange multiplier for CLIENTn. Since we assume
ψn > 0 for all n, the problem CLIENTn is well-defined
for all n, and so is ξn. Also, let ζ and µ be the Lagrange
multipliers for ACCESS-POINT . Since qn > 0 for all n,
we have µn = 0 for all n by (18). By (16), we also have:
∂LNET
∂qn
∣∣∣∣
q,ζ,µ
= − ρnqn +
P
S∋n ζS
pn
− µn
= −ψn +
P
S∋n
ζS
pn
= 0,
and thus ψn =
P
S∋n
ζS
pn
. Let λS = ζS , for all S, and νn =
ψnξn, for all n. We claim that q is the optimal solution to
SY STEM with Lagrange multipliers λ and ν.
Since q is a solution to ACCESS-POINT , it is feasible.
Further, we have:
∂LSY S
∂qn
∣∣∣∣
q,λ,ν
= −U ′n(qn) +
P
S∋n λS
pn
− νn
= −U ′n( ρnψn ) + ψn − ψnξn = 0, ∀n, by (13),
λS [
∑
n∈S
qn
pn
− (τ − IS)] = ζS [
∑
n∈S
qn
pn
− (τ − IS)]
= 0, ∀S, by (17),
νnqn = ξnρn = 0, ∀n, by (14),
λS = ζS ≥ 0, ∀S, by (19),
νn = ψnξn ≥ 0, ∀n, by (15).
Thus, (q, λ, ν) satisfy the KKT condition for SY STEM ,
and so q is a solution to SY STEM .
V. A BIDDING GAME BETWEEN CLIENTS AND ACCESS
POINT
Theorem 2 states that the maximum total utility of
the system can be achieved when the solutions to the
problems CLIENTn and ACCESS-POINT agree. In
this section, we formulate a repeated game for such
reconciliation. We also discuss the meanings of the prob-
lems CLIENTn and ACCESS-POINT in this repeated
game.
The repeated game is formulated as follows:
Step 1: Each client n announces an amount ρn that it
pays per period.
Step 2: After noting the amounts, ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρN , paid by
the clients, the AP chooses a scheduling policy so
that the resulting long-term delivery ratio, qn, for
each client maximizes
∑N
i=1 ρi log qi.
Step 3: The client n observes its own delivery ratio, qn. It
computes ψn := ρn/qn. It then determines ρ
∗
n ≥ 0
to maximize Un(
ρ∗n
ψn
) − ρ∗n. Client n updates the
amount it pays to (1−α)ρn+αρ∗n, with some fixed
0 < α < 1, and announces the new bid value.
Step 4: Go back to Step 2.
In Step 3 of the game, client n chooses its new amount
of payment as a weighted average of the past amount and
5the derived optimal value, instead of the derived optimal
value. This design serves two purposes. First, it seeks to
avoid the system from oscillating between two extreme
values. Second, since ρn is initiated to a positive value,
and ρ∗n derived in each iteration is always non-negative,
this design guarantees ρn to be positive throughout all
iterations. Since ψn = ρn/qn, this also ensures ψn > 0 and
the function Un(
ρn
ψn
) is consequently always well-defined.
We show that the fixed point of this repeated game
maximizes the total utility of the system:
Theorem 3: Suppose at the fixed point of the repeated
game, each client n pays ρ∗n per period, and receives
delivery ratio q∗n. If both ρ
∗
n and q
∗
n are positive for all
n, the vector q∗ maximizes the total utility of the system.
Proof: Let ψ∗n =
ρ∗n
q∗n
. It is positive since both ρ∗n and q
∗
n
are positive. Since the vectors q∗ and ρ∗ are derived from
the fixed point, ρ∗n maximizes Un(
ρn
ψ∗n
)−ρn, over all ρn ≥ 0,
as described in Step 3 of the game. Thus, ρ∗n is a solution
to CLIENTn, given ρ
∗
n = ψ
∗
nq
∗
n. Similarly, from Step 2, q
∗
is the feasible vector that maximizes
∑N
i=1 ρ
∗
i log qi, over
all feasible vectors q. Thus, q∗ is a solution to ACCESS-
POINT , given that each client n pays ρ∗n per period. By
Theorem 2, q∗ is the unique solution to SY STEM and
therefore maximizes the total utility of the system.
Next, we describe the meaning of the game. In Step
3, client n assumes a linear relation between the amount
it pays, ρn, and the delivery ratio it receives, qn. To be
more exactly, it assumes ρn = ψnqn, where ψn is the price.
Thus, maximizing Un(
ρn
ψn
)−ρn is equivalent to maximizing
Un(qn) − ρn. Recall that Un(qn) is the utility that client
n obtains when it receives delivery ratio qn. Un(qn)− ρn
is therefore the net profit that client n gets. In short, in
Step 3, the goal of client n is to selfishly maximize its own
net profit using a first order linear approximation to the
relation between payment and delivery ratio.
We next discuss the behavior of the AP in Step 2. The
AP schedules clients so that the resulting delivery ratio
vector q is a solution to the problem ACCESS-POINT ,
given that each client n pays ρn per period. Thus, q
is feasible and there exists vectors ζ and µ that satisfy
conditions (16)–(19). While it is difficult to solve this
problem, we consider a special restrictive case that gives
us a simple solution and insights into the AP’s behavior.
Let TOT := {1, 2, . . . , N} be the set that consists of all
clients. We assume that a solution (q, ζ, µ) to the problem
has the following properties: ζS = 0, for all S 6= TOT ,
ζTOT > 0, and µn = 0, for all n. By (16), we have:
−ρn
qn
+
∑
S∋n ζS
pn
− µn = −ρn
qn
+
ζTOT
pn
= 0,
and therefore qn = pnρn/ζTOT . Further, since ζTOT > 0,
(17) requires that:
∑
i∈TOT
qi
pi
− (τ − ITOT ) =
∑
i∈TOT
ρi
ζTOT
− (τ − ITOT ) = 0.
Thus, ζTOT =
PN
i=1
ρi
τ−ITOT and
qn
pn
= ρnPN
i=1
mi
(τ − ITOT ), for
all n. Notice that the derived (q, ζ, µ) satisfies conditions
(16)–(19). Thus, under the assumption that q is feasible,
this special case actually maximizes
∑N
i=1 ρi log qi. In
Section VI we will address the general situation without
any such assumption, since it needs not be true.
Recall that ITOT is the average number of time slots
that the AP is forced to be idle in a period after it
has completed all clients. Also, by Lemma 1, qnpn is the
workload of client n, that is, the average number of time
slots that the AP should spend working for client n. Thus,
letting qnpn =
ρnP
N
i=1
ρi
(τ − ITOT ), for all n, the AP tries
to allocate those non-idle time slots so that the average
number of time slots each client gets is proportional to its
payment. Although we only study the special case of ITOT
here, we will show that the same behavior also holds for
the general case in the Section VI.
In summary, the game proposed in this section actually
describes a bidding game, where clients are bidding for
non-idle time slots. Each client gets a share of time slots
that is proportional to its bid. The AP thus assigns delivery
ratios, based on which the clients calculate a price and
selfishly maximize their own net profits. Finally, Theorem
3 states that the equilibrium point of this game maximizes
the total utility of the system.
VI. A SCHEDULING POLICY FOR SOLVING
ACCESS-POINT
In Section V, we have shown that by setting qn =
pn
ρnP
N
i=1mi
(τ − ITOT ), the resulting vector q solves
ACCESS-POINT provided q is indeed feasible. Un-
fortunately, such q is not always feasible and solving
ACCESS-POINT is in general difficult. Even for the
special case discussed in Section V, solving ACCESS-
POINT requires knowledge of channel conditions, that
is, pn. In this section, we propose a very simple priority
based scheduling policy that can achieve the optimal
solution for ACCESS-POINT , and that too without any
knowledge of the channel conditions.
In the special case discussed in Section V, the AP tries,
though it may be impossible in general, to allocate non-
idle time slots to clients in proportion to their payments.
Based on this intuitive guideline, we design the following
scheduling policy. Let un(t) be the number of time slots
that the AP has allocated for client n up to time t. At
the beginning of each period, the AP sorts all clients in
increasing order of
un(t)
ρn
, so that
u1(t)
ρ1
≤ u2(t)ρ2 ≤ . . . after
renumbering clients if necessary. The AP then schedules
transmissions according to the priority ordering, where
clients with smaller
un(t)
ρn
get higher priorities. Specifically,
in each time slot during the period, the AP chooses the
smallest i for which the packet for client i is not yet
delivered, and then transmits the packet for client i in
that time slot. We call this the weighted transmission policy
(WT). Notice that the policy only requires the AP to keep
track of the bids of clients and the number of time slots
each client has been allocated in the past, followed by a
sorting of
un(t)
ρn
among all clients. Thus, the policy requires
no information on the actual channel conditions, and is
tractable. Simple as it is, we show that the policy actually
achieves the optimal solution for ACCESS-POINT . In
the following sections, we first prove that the vector of
6delivery ratios resulting from the WT policy converges to
a single point. We then prove that this limit is the opti-
mal solution for ACCESS-POINT . Finally, we establish
that the WT policy additionally achieves some forms of
fairness.
A. Convergence of the Weighted Transmission Policy
We now prove that, by applying the WT policy, the de-
livery ratios of clients will converge to a vector q. To do so,
we actually prove the convergence property and precise
limit of a more general class of scheduling policies, which
not only consists of the WT policy but also a scheduling
policy proposed in [8]. The proof is similar to that used in
[8] and is based on Blackwell’s approachability theorem
[3]. The proof in [8] only shows that the vector of delivery
ratios approaches a desirable set in the N -space under a
particular policy, while here we prove that the vector of
delivery ratios converges to a single point under a more
general class of scheduling policies. Thus, our result is
both stronger and more general than the one in [8].
We start by introducing Blackwell’s approachability the-
orem. Consider a single player repeated game. In each
round i of the game, the player chooses some action,
a(i), and receives a reward v(i), which is a random
vector whose distribution is a function of a(i). Blackwell
studies the long-term average of the rewards received,
limj→∞
∑j
i=1 v(i)/j, defining a set as approachable, under
some policy, if the distance between
∑j
i=1 v(i)/j and the
set converges to 0 with probability one, as j →∞.
Theorem 4 (Blackwell [3]): Let A ⊆ RN be any closed
set. Suppose that for every x /∈ A, a policy η chooses
an action a (= a(x)), which results in an expected payoff
vector E(v). If the hyperplane through y, the closest point
in A to x, perpendicular to the line segment xy, separates
x from E(v), then A is approachable with the policy η.
Now we formulate our more general class of scheduling
policies. We call a policy a generalized transmission time
policy if, for a choice of a positive parameter vector a and
non-negative parameter vector b, the AP sorts clients by
anun(t) − bnt at the beginning of each period, and gives
priorities to clients with lower values of this quantity. Note
that the special case an ≡ 1ρn and bn ≡ 0 yields the WT
policy, while the choice an ≡ 1 and bn ≡ qnpn yields the
largest time-based debt first policy of [8], and thus we
describe a more general set of policies.
Theorem 5: For each generalized transmission time pol-
icy, there exists a vector q such that the vector of work
loads resulting from the policy converges to w(q) :=
[wn(qn)].
Proof: Given the parameters {(an, bn) : 1 ≤ n ≤ N},
we give an exact expression for the limiting q. We define
a sequence of sets {Hk} and corresponding values {θk}
iteratively as follows. Let H0 := φ, θ0 := −∞, and
Hk := arg min
S:S%Hk−1
1
τ (IHk−1 − IS)−
∑
n∈S\Hk−1
bn
an∑
n∈S\Hk−1 1/an
,
θk :=
1
τ (IHk−1 − IHk)−
∑
n∈Hk\Hk−1
bn
an∑
n∈Hk\Hk−1 1/an
, for all k > 0.
In selecting Hk, we always choose a maximal subset,
breaking ties arbitrary. (H1, θ1), (H2, θ2), . . . , can be it-
eratively defined until every client is in some Hk. Also,
by the definition, we have θk > θk−1, for all k > 0. If
client n is in Hk\Hk−1, we define qn := τpn bn+θkan , and
so wn(qn) = τ
bn+θk
an
. The proof of convergence consists
of two parts. First we prove that the vector of work
performed (see Lemma 1 for definition) approaches the
set {w∗|w∗n ≥ wn(qn)}. Then we prove that w(q) is the
only feasible vector in the set {w∗|w∗n ≥ wn(qn)}. Since
the feasible region for work loads, defined as the set of
all feasible vectors for work loads, is approachable under
any policy, the vector of work performed resulting from
the generalized transmission time policy must converge
to w(q).
For the first part, we prove the following statement: for
each k ≥ 1, the set Wk := {w∗|w∗n ≥ τ bn+θkan , ∀n /∈ Hk−1}
is approachable. Since ∩i≥0Wi = {w∗|w∗n ≥ wn(qn)}, we
also prove that {w∗|w∗n ≥ wn(qn)} is approachable.
Consider a linear transformation on the space of work-
loads L(w) := [ln : ln =
anwn/τ−bn√
an
]. Proving Wk is
approachable is equivalent to proving that its image under
L, Vk := {l|ln ≥ θk√an , ∀n /∈ Hk−1}, is approachable.
Now we apply Blackwell’s theorem. Suppose at some
time t that is the beginning of a period, the number
of time slots that the AP has worked on client n is
un(t). The work performed for client n is
un(t)
t/τ , and
the image of the vector of work performed under L
is x(t) := [xn(t)|xn(t) = anun(t)/t−bn√an ], which we shall
suppose is not in Vk. The generalized transmission time
policy sorts clients so that a1u1(t)−b1 ≤ a2u2(t)−b2 ≤ . . . ,
or equivalently,
√
a1x1(t) ≤ √a2x2(t) ≤ . . . . The closest
point in Vk to x(t) is y := [yn], where yn =
θk√
an
, if
xn(t) <
θk√
an
and n /∈ Hk−1, and yn = xn, otherwise.
The hyperplane that passes through y and is orthogonal
to the line segment xy is:
{z|f(z) :=
∑
n:n≤n0,n/∈Hk−1
(zn − θk√
an
)(xn(t)− θk√
an
) = 0}.
Let πn be the expected number of time slots that the AP
spends on working for client n in this period under the
generalized transmission time policy. The image under L
of the expected reward in this period is πL := [
anpin/τ−bn√
an
].
Blackwell’s theorem shows that Vk is approachable if x(t)
and πL are separated by the plane {z|f(z) = 0}. Since
f(x(t)) ≥ 0, it suffices to show f(πL) ≤ 0.
We manipulate the original ordering, for this period,
so that all clients in Hk−1 have higher priorities than
those not in Hk−1, while preserving the relative ordering
between clients not in Hk−1. Note this manipulation will
not give any client n /∈ Hk−1 higher priority than it had in
the original ordering. Therefore, πn will not increase for
any n /∈ Hk−1. Since the value of f(πL) only depends on
πn for n /∈ Hk−1, and increases as those πn decrease, this
manipulation will not decrease the value of f(πL). Thus, it
suffices to prove that f(πL) ≤ 0, under this new ordering.
Let n0 := |Hk−1|+ 1. Under this new ordering, we have:
7√
an0xn0(t) ≤ √an0+1xn0+1(t) ≤ · · · ≤ √an1xn1(t) <
θk ≤ √an1+1xn1+1(t) ≤ . . . .
Let δn =
√
anxn(t)−√an+1xn+1(t), for n0 ≤ n ≤ n1−1
and δn1 =
√
an1xn1(t) − θk. Clearly, δn ≤ 0, for all n0 ≤
n ≤ n1. Now we can derive:
f(πL) =
n1∑
n=n0
(
anπn/τ − bn√
an
− θk√
an
)(xn(t)− θk√
an
)
=
n1∑
n=n0
(
πn
τ
− bn
an
− θk
an
)(
√
anxn(t)− θk)
=
n1∑
i=n0
(
∑i
n=n0
πn
τ
−
i∑
n=n0
bn
an
− θk
i∑
n=n0
1
an
)δi.
Recall that IS is the expected number of idle time slots
when the AP only caters on the subset S. Thus, under this
ordering, we have
∑i
n=1 πn = τ − I{1,...,i}, for all i, and∑i
n=n0
πn = I{1,...,n0−1} − I{1,...,i} = IHk−1 − I{1,...,i}, for
all i ≥ n0. By the definition of Hk and θk, we also have
∑i
n=n0
πn
τ
−
i∑
n=n0
bn
an
− θk
i∑
n=n0
1
an
=(
i∑
n=n0
1
an
)(
1
τ (IHk−1 − I{1,...,i})−
∑i
n=n0
bn
an∑
n∈{1,...,i}\Hk−1 1/an
− θk) ≥ 0.
Therefore, f(πL) ≤ 0, since δi ≤ 0, and Vk is indeed
approachable, for all k.
We have established that the set {w∗|w∗n ≥ wn(qn)}
is approachable. Next we prove that [wn(qn)] is the only
feasible vector in the set. Consider any vector w′ 6= w(q)
in the set. We have w′n ≥ wn(qn) for all n, and w′n0 >
wn0(qn0), for some n0. Suppose n0 ∈ Hk\Hk−1. We have:
∑
n∈Hk
w′n >
∑
n∈Hk
wn(qn) =
k∑
i=1
∑
n∈Hi\Hi−1
τ
bn + θk
an
=
∑k
i=1(IHi−1 − IHi) = τ − IHk ,
and thus w′ is not feasible. Therefore, w(q) is the only
feasible vector in {w∗|w∗n ≥ wn(qn)}, and the vector of
work performed resulting from the generalized transmis-
sion time policy must converge to w(q).
Corollary 1: For the policy of Theorem 5, the vector of
delivery ratios converges to q.
Proof: Follows from Lemma 1.
B. Optimality of the Weighted Transmission Policy for
ACCESS-POINT
Theorem 6: Given [ρn], the vector q of long-term av-
erage delivery ratios resulting from the WT policy is a
solution to ACCESS-POINT .
Proof: We use the sequence of sets {Hk} and values
{θk}, with an := 1ρn and bn := 0, as defined in the proof of
Theorem 5. Let K := |{θk}|. Thus, we have HK = TOT =
{1, 2, . . . , N}. Also, let mk := |Hk|. For convenience, we
renumber clients so that Hk = {1, 2, . . . ,mk}. The proof
of Theorem 5 shows that qn = τpnθkρn, for n ∈ Hk\Hk−1.
Therefore, wn(qn) =
qn
pn
= τθkρn. Obviously, q is feasible,
since it is indeed achieved by the WT policy. Thus, to
establish optimality, we only need to prove the existence
of vectors ζ and µ that satisfy conditions (16)–(19).
Set µn = 0, for all n. Let ζHK = ζTOT :=
ρN
wN (qN )
= 1τθK
and ζHk :=
ρmk
wmk (qmk )
− ρmk+1wmk+1(qmk+1 ) =
1
τθk
− 1τθk+1 ,
for 1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1. Finally, let ζS := 0, for all
S /∈ {H1, H2, . . . , HK}. We claim that the vectors ζ and
µ, along with q, satisfy conditions (16)–(19).
We first evaluate condition (16). Suppose client n is in
Hk\Hk−1. Then client n is also in Hk+1, Hk+2, . . . , HK .
So,
− ρn
qn
+
∑
S∋n ζS
pn
− µn = − 1
τθkpn
+
∑K
i=k ζHi
pn
=− 1
τθkpn
+
1
τθkpn
= 0.
Thus, condition (16) is satisfied.
Since µn = 0, for all n, condition (18) is satisfied. Fur-
ther, since 1θk >
1
θk+1
, for all 1 ≤ k ≤ K−1, condition (19)
is also satisfied. It remains to establish condition (17).
Since ζS = 0 for all S /∈ {H1, H2, . . . , HK}, we only need
to show
∑
i∈S
qi
pi
−(τ−IS) = 0 for S ∈ {H1, H2, . . . , HK}.
Consider Hk. For each client i ∈ Hk and each client j /∈
Hk,
wi(qi)
ρi
<
wj(qj)
ρj
. Since wn(qn) is the average number
of time slots that the AP spends on working for client n,
we have
ui(t)
ρi
<
uj(t)
ρj
, for all i ∈ Hk and j /∈ Hk, after
a finite number of periods. Therefore, except for a finite
number of periods, clients in Hk will have priorities over
those not in Hk. In other words, if we only consider the
behavior of those clients in Hk, it is the same as if the AP
only works on the subset Hk of clients. Further, recall that
IHk is the expected number of time slots that the AP is
forced to stay idle when the AP only works on the subset
Hk of clients. Thus, we have
∑
i∈Hk wi(qi) = τ − IHk and∑
i∈Hk
qi
pi
− (τ − IHk) = 0, for all k.
C. Fairness of Allocated Delivery Ratios
We now show that the WT policy not only solves the
ACCESS-POINT problem but also achieves some forms
of fairness among clients. Two common fairness criteria
are max-min fair and proportionally fair. We extend the
definitions of these two criteria as follows:
Definition 3: A scheduling policy is called weighted
max-min fair with positive weight vector a = [an] if it
achieves q, and, for any other feasible vector q′, we have:
q′i > qi ⇒ q′j < qj , for some j such that wi(qi)ai ≥
wj(qj)
aj
.
Definition 4: A scheduling policy is called weighted pro-
portionally fair with positive weight vector a if it achieves
q and, for any other feasible vector q′, we have:
∑N
n=1
wn(q
′
n)− wn(qn)
wn(qn)/an
≤ 0.
Next, we prove that the WT policy is both weighted
max-min fair and proportionally fair with weight vector
ρ.
Theorem 7: The weighted transmission policy is
weighted max-min fair with weight ρ
8Proof: We sort clients and define {Hk} as in the proof
of Theorem 6. Let q be the vector achieved by the WT
policy and q′ be any feasible vector. Suppose q′i > qi
for some i. Assume client i is in Hk\Hk−1. The proof
in Theorem 6 shows that
∑
n∈Hk wn(qn) = τ − IHk .
On the other hand, the feasibility condition requires∑
n∈Hk wn(q
′
n) ≤ τ − IHk =
∑
n∈Hk wn(qn). Further, since
q′i > qi, wi(q
′
i) > wi(qi), there must exist some j ∈ Hk
so that wj(q
′
j) < wj(qj), that is, q
′
j < qj . Finally, since
i ∈ Hk\Hk−1, we have wi(qi)ρi ≥
wn(qn)
ρn
, for all n ∈ Hk,
and hence
wi(qi)
ρi
≥ wj(qj)ρj .
Theorem 8: The weighted transmission policy is pro-
portionally fair with weight ρ.
Proof: We sort clients and define {Hk} as in the proof
of Theorem 6. Let q be the vector achieved by the WT
policy, and let q′ be any feasible vector. We have wi(qi)ρi =
τθk, if i ∈ Hk\Hk−1. Define ∆k :=
∑
n∈Hk\Hk−1 wn(q
′
n)−
wn(qn).
To prove the theorem, we prove a stronger statement
by induction:
∑
n∈Hk
wn(q
′
n)− wn(qn)
wn(qn)/ρn
=
k∑
i=1
∆i
τθi
≤ 0, for all k > 0.
First consider the case k = 1. The proof in Theorem
6 shows that
∑
n∈H1 wn(qn) = τ − IH1 . Further, the
feasibility condition requires
∑
n∈H1 wn(q
′
n) ≤ τ − IH1 =∑
n∈H1 wn(qn) = τ − IH1 , and so ∆1 =
∑
n∈H1 wn(q
′
n) −
wn(qn) ≤ 0. Thus, we have ∆1τθ1 ≤ 0.
Suppose we have
∑k
i=1
∆i
τθi
≤ 0, for all k ≤ k0. Again,
the proof in Theorem 6 gives us
∑
n∈Hk0+1 wn(qn) =
τ − IHk0+1 and the feasibility condition requires∑
n∈Hk0+1 wn(q
′
n) ≤ τ−IHk0+1 =
∑
n∈Hk0+1 wn(qn). Thus,∑k0+1
i=1 ∆i ≤ 0. We can further derive:
k0+1∑
i=1
∆i
τθi
≤
k0∑
i=1
∆i
τθi
(1− θi
θk0+1
) (since
k0+1∑
i=1
∆i
τθk0+1
≤ 0)
=
k0∑
j=1
[(
θj+1 − θj
θk0+1
)
j∑
i=1
∆i
τθi
]
≤0 (since
j∑
i=1
∆i
τθi
≤ 0, and θj+1 > θj , ∀j ≤ k0)
By induction,
∑k
i=1
∆i
τθi
≤ 0, for all k. Finally, we have:
N∑
n=1
wn(q
′
n)− wn(qn)
wn(qn)/ρn
=
K∑
i=1
∆i
τθi
≤ 0,
and the WT policy is proportionally fair with weight ρ.
VII. SIMULATION RESULTS
We have implemented the WT policy and the bidding
game, as described in Section V, on ns-2. We use the
Fig. 1: Convergence of the weighted transmission policy
G.711 codec for audio compression to set the simulation
parameters, as summarized in Table I. All results in this
section are averages of 20 simulation runs.
TABLE I: Simulation Setup
Packetization interval 20 ms
Payload size per packet 160 Bytes
Transmission data rate 11 Mb/s
Transmission time (including MAC overheads) 610 µs
# of time slots in a period 32
A. Convergence Time for the Weighted Transmission Policy
We have proved that the vector of delivery ratios will
converge under the WT policy in Section VI-A. However,
the speed of convergence is not discussed. In the bidding
game, we assume that the delivery ratio observed by each
client is post convergence. Thus, it is important to verify
whether the WT policy converges quickly. In this simula-
tion, we assume that there are 30 clients in the system.
The nth client has channel reliability (50+n)% and offers
a bid ρn = (n mod 2)+1. We run each simulation for 10
seconds simulation time and then compare the absolute
difference of
∑
n ρn log qn between the delivery ratios at
the end of each period with those after 10 seconds. In
particular, we artificially set qn = 0.001 if the delivery
ratio for client n is zero, to avoid computation error for
log qn.
Simulation results are shown in Fig. 1. It can be seen
that the delivery ratios converge rather quickly. At time
0.2 seconds, the difference is smaller than 1.4, which is
less than 10% of the final value. Based on this observation,
we assume that each client updates its bid every 0.2
seconds in the following simulations.
B. Utility Maximization
In this section, we study the total utility that is achieved
by iterating between the bidding game and the WT policy,
which we call WT-Bid. We assume that the utility function
of each client n is given by γn
qαnn −1
αn
, where γn is a
positive integer and 0 < αn < 1. This utility function is
strictly increasing, strictly concave, and differentiable for
any γn and αn. In addition to evaluating the policy WT-
Bid, we also compare the results of three other policies: a
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(b) Variance of total utility
Fig. 2: Performance of total utility
policy that employs the WT policy but without updating
the bids from clients, which we call WT-NoBid; a policy
that decides priorities randomly among clients at the
beginning of each period, which we call Rand; and a
policy that gives clients with larger γn higher priorities,
with ties broken randomly, which we call P-Rand.
In each simulation, we assume there are 30 clients. The
nth client has channel reliability pn = (50+n)%, γn = (n
mod 3) + 1, and αn = 0.3 + 0.1(n mod 5). In addition
to plotting the average of total utility over all simulation
runs, we also plot the variance of total utility.
Fig. 2 shows the simulation results. The WT-Bid policy
not only achieves the highest average total utility but also
the smallest variance. This result suggests that the WT-
Bid policy converges very fast. On the other hand, the
WT-NoBid policy fails to provide satisfactory performance
since it does not consider the different utility functions
that clients may have. The P-Rand policy offers much
better performance than both the WT-NoBid policy and
the Rand policy since it correctly gives higher priority
to clients with higher γn. Still, it cannot differentiate
between clients with the same γn and thus can only
provide suboptimal performance.
VIII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have studied the problem of utility maximization
problem for clients that demand delay-based QoS support
from an access point. Based on an analytical model for
QoS support proposed in previous work, we formulate
the utility maximization problem as a convex optimiza-
tion problem. We decompose the problem into two sim-
pler subproblems, namely, CLIENTn and ACCESS-
POINT . We have proved that the total utility of the
system can be maximized by jointly solving the two sub-
problems. We also describe a bidding game to reconciliate
the two subproblems. In the game, each client announces
its bid to maximize its own net profit and the AP allocates
time slots to achieve the optimal point of ACCESS-
POINT . We have proved that the equilibrium point of
the bidding game jointly solves the two subproblems, and
therefore achieves the maximum total utility.
In addition, we have proposed a very simple, priority-
based weighted transmission policy for solving the
ACCESS-POINT subproblem. This policy does not re-
quire that the AP know the channel reliabilities of the
clients, or their individual utilities. We have proved that
the long-term performance of a general class of priority-
based policies that includes our proposed policy converges
to a single point. We then proved that the limiting point of
the proposed scheduling policy is the optimal solution to
ACCESS-POINT . Moreover, we have also proved that
the resulting allocation by the AP satisfies some forms of
fairness criteria. Finally, we have implemented both the
bidding game and the scheduling policy in ns-2. Simu-
lation results suggests that the scheduling policy quickly
results in convergence. Further, by iterating between the
bidding game and the WT policy, the resulting total utility
is higher than other tested policies.
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